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1 Introduction
The central concern of this paper is to explore the relation between trade structure and belief-
driven economic fluctuations. Using a dynamic two-country model with country-specific
production externalities, we inspect conditions for equilibrium indeterminacy under alterna-
tive trade structures. In the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy, non-fundamental shocks
(sunspots) affect expectations of agents, which gives rise to belief-driven business cycles. In
this case not only shocks to the fundamentals but also extrinsic uncertainty can generate busi-
ness fluctuations. We consider which trade structures may yield equilibrium indeterminacy
in a wider parameter space than in the closed economy counterpart.
As for our question, the foregoing literature has provided us with two contrasting answers.
On the one hand, Meng (2003), Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) and Weder (2001) show
that small-open economies with production externalities hold indeterminacy under weaker
conditions than in the corresponding closed economy models.1 Hence, according to these
studies, opening up international trade may enhance the possibility of economic fluctuations.
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), on the other hand, examine a dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin
model of the two-country world in which there are country-specific production externalities.
They show that the world economy has the same conditions for equilibrium indeterminacy as
those for the closed economy counterpart. In addition, Sim and Ho (2007) find that if one of
the two countries has no production externalities in Nishimura and Shimomura’s model, then
the equilibrium path of the world economy would be determinate even though the country
with production externalities exhibits autarkic indeterminacy. These studies indicate that
international trade does not necessarily enhance the possibility of belief-driven fluctuations.
At first sight, the opposite results mentioned above seem to stem from the difference
in the modelling method used by the existing studies. The small-open economy models are
based on partial equilibrium analysis in which behavior of the rest of the world is exogenously
given. In contrast, the models of world economy employ the general equilibrium approach
that treats the world economic system as a closed economy consisting of multiple countries.
Thus one may think that the behavior of an integrated world economy is similar to the
1Lahiri (2001) also examines indeterminacy in a small-open economy model. Since he uses a framework
different from the one used by Meng (2003) and others, his model needs a relatively high degree of external
increasing returns to yield indeterminacy. Yong and Meng (2004) and Zhang (2008) also discuss equilibrium
indeterminacy in small-open economies.
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behavior of a closed economy. Such a conjecture is, however, misleading. We demonstrate
that the key to the relation between international trade and belief-driven fluctuations is the
specification of trade structure rather than the difference in modeling strategy, that is, partial
versus general equilibrium analyses. In the foregoing investigations, the papers on small-open
economies such as Meng and Velasco (2003, 2004) and Weder (2001) assume that investment
goods are not internationally traded, while consumption goods are traded and international
lending and borrowing are allowed. By contrast, Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) follow the
Heckscher-Ohlin tradition where both consumption and investment goods are traded, while
neither international lending nor borrowing are possible. We show that, as well as in the
small-open economy models, if investment goods are traded in the domestic market alone,
then the world economy model exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy under weaker conditions
than those for the closed economy model.
More specifically, we construct a 2×2×2model of the world economy in which each country
produces both investment and consumption goods under social constant returns. It is assumed
that both countries have identical technologies and preferences. If we assume that both
investment and consumption goods are tradable and international lending and borrowing are
not allowed, then our model is identical to Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), so that opening
up international trade does not affect the indeterminacy conditions. If investment goods are
nontradables and international financial transactions are possible, then the world economy
exhibits indeterminacy in a wider range of parameter space than in the corresponding closed
economy. Finally, if consumption goods are not traded but investment goods are tradable in
the presence of international lending and borrowing, then it is shown that the indeterminacy
conditions are the same as those for the closed economy.
As suggested above, this paper is closely related to Meng and Velasco (2004) and Nishimura
and Shimomura (2002). Both papers are based on Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) who in-
vestigate indeterminacy conditions in a closed, two-sector growth model with sector-specific
production externalities and social constant returns. The main finding of Benhabib and
Nishimura (1998) is that (i) if the consumption good sector is more capital intensive than the
investment good sector from the private perspective but it is less capital intensive from the
social perspective; and (ii) if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption of the
representative family is sufficiently large, then there is a continuum of converging equilibrium
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paths around the steady sate. Since the integrated world economy discussed by Nishimura
and Shimomura (2002) behaves like a single, closed economy, the indeterminacy conditions
for their model is the same as those shown by Benhabib and Nishimura (1998). Meng and
Velasco (2004) find that in a small-open economy model in which investment goods are non-
traded and there are international lending and borrowing, only condition (i) is necessary for
establishing indeterminacy: the shape of utility function has no relation to the indetermi-
nacy conditions.2 Our paper uses Nishimura and Shimomura’s setting as the base model and
introduces nontraded goods and intertemporal trade. The case where investment goods are
not traded is, therefore, a two-(large) country version of Meng and Velasco (2004).3
The roles of nontraded goods have been extensively discussed in the literature. The static
trade theory has focused on the effects of nontraded goods on trade patterns, terms of trade
and resource allocation: see, for example, Komiya (1967), Either (1972) and Jones (1974).
Also, there is a vast literature on this topic in international macroeconomics and finance.
Those macroeconomic studies have been concerned with how the presence of nontraded goods
affects real exchange rates, current accounts, asset positions, policy impacts and international
business cycles caused by the fundamental shocks.4 Turnovsky (1997, Chapter 4), among
others, points out that the analytical outcomes may critically depend on which goods are
not internationally traded. The foregoing contributions in most cases explore models with
equilibrium determinacy. Therefore, the relation between trade structure and belief-driven
business cycles has not been explored well in the foregoing studies. Our paper demonstrates
that nontraded goods and trade structure play pivotal roles as to the destabilizing effect
of international trade caused by indeterminacy and sunspots. We also confirm that in the
presence of equilibrium indeterminacy, the long-run distribution of wealth in the world market
2 In the two-sector endogenous growth model of a closed economy where each sector employes physical and
human capital under social constant returns, the condition (ii) is not needed for holding indeterminacy: see
Benhabib et al. (2000) and Mino (2001).
3Weder (2001) examines an open economy version of a two-sector closed economy model studied by Ben-
habib and Farmer (1996). In Weder’s model the production technology of each sector exhibits constant returns
from the private perspective, while it satisfies increasing (or decreasing) returns from the social perspective. It
is also assumed that labor supply is endogenous and private factor intensity is identical in both sectors. Weder
(2001) also considers the case where the home country is not small so that the world interest rate depends on
the asset holding of the home country. Despite those differences from Meng and Velasco (2003), Weder (2001)
also finds that the open economy yields indeterminacy under weaker restrictions than the closed economy.
4A small sample includes Baxter et al, (1998), Brock (1988), Engel and Kletzer (1989) and Turnovsky and
Sen (1995). Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 4) and Turnovsky (1997, Chapter 4) present lucid expositions
of open-macroeconomic models with nontraded goods.
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and the steady-state level of asset position of each country become indeterminate: not only
the initial holding of asset of each country but also sunspot shocks affect these long-run values.
Therefore, if belief-driven economic fluctuations exist, we obtain outcomes and implications
that are quite different from those obtained when the equilibrium path of the world economy
is determinate.
In what follows, we first sets up an analytical basis of our discussion. Then we examine
three types of trade structures: (i) both investment and consumption goods are tradables; (ii)
only consumption goods are traded and; (iii) only investment goods are traded. In case (i)
international lending and borrowing are not allowed. Cases (ii) and (iii) assume the presence
of lending and borrowing between the two countries. The next section presents the base
model. Section 3 examines case (i). Section 4, the main part of our paper, investigates cases
(ii) and (iii). Section 5 gives intuitive implication of our findings. This section also discusses
empirical plausibility of the assumptions made for establishing our main results.
2 Baseline Setting
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, home and foreign. Both countries have
the same production technologies. In each country there is the representative household.
Households in both countries have an identical time discount rate and the same form of
instantaneous felicity function. The only difference between the two countries is the initial
stock of wealth held by the households in each country. In this section we concentrate on
modelling the home country. Since taste and technology are symmetric between the two
countries, the following formulations are applied to the foreign country as well.
2.1 Production
The production side of our model is the same as that used by Nishimura and Shimomura
(2002). The home country has two production sectors. The first sector (i = 1) produces
investment goods and the second sector (i = 2) produces pure consumption goods. The





i X¯i, ai > 0, bi > 0, 0 < ai + bi < 1, i = 1, 2,
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where Yi, Ki and Li are i-th sector’s output, capital and labor input, respectively. Here, X¯i





i , ai < αi < 1, αi + bi < 1 i = 1, 2.
Normalizing the number of producers to one, then it holds that K¯i = Ki and L¯i = Li (i = 1, 2)
in equilibrium. This means that the i-th sector’s social production technology that internal-





i , i = 1, 2. (1)
Hence, the social technology satisfies constant returns to scale, while the private technology
exhibits decreasing returns to scale.6
The factor and product markets are competitive, so that the private marginal product
















where w is the real wage rate, r is the rental rate of capital and p denotes the price of
investment good in terms of the consumption good.











where ki = Ki/Li. (i = 1, 2) . By use of (3a) and (3b) , we can express the optimal factor
5We shall omit time argument in each endogenous variable unless necessary.
6This specification of production technology was first introduced by Benbhabib and Nishimura (1998)
who demonstrate that equilibrium indterminacy may hold even in the absence of social increasing returns.
Benhabib et al. (2000), Meng (2003), Meng and Velasco (2003, 2004), Mino (2001) and Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002) use the same production functions.
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α2−α1 ≡ k2 (p) ,
These expressions show that








sign k0i (p) = sign (α2 − α1) , i = 1, 2. (6)
In the above, the sign of a1/b1 − a2/b2 represents the factor intensity ranking from the
private perspective, while sign (α1 − α2) expresses the factor intensity ranking from the
social perspective.
We assume that production factors shiftable between the sectors, but they cannot cross
the borders. Thus the full employment conditions for capital and labor in the home country
are respectively given by
K1 +K2 = K, L1 + L2 = 1.
where K denotes the aggregate capital in the home country. The labor supply is assumed to
be constant and normalized to one. These full-employment conditions are summarized as
k1 (p)L1 + (1− L1) k2 (p) = K. (7)
In this paper we restrict our attention to the interior equilibrium in which the two countries
produce both consumption and investment goods.7 Thus we focus on the situation where the
labor allocation to the first sector given by (7) satisfies the following:
L1 =
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p)− k2 (p)
∈ (0, 1) . (8)
7See Footnote 10 on this restriction.
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The supply functions of investment and consumption goods are respectively given by
y1 (K,p) ≡ L1A1k1 (p)α1 =
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p)− k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 , (9a)
y2 (K, p) = (1− L1)A2k2 (p)α2 ≡
k1 (p)−K
k1 (p)− k2 (p)
A2k2 (p)
α2 . (9b)
It is easy to see that these supply functions satisfy:














(α1 − α2) , (10a)














(α1 − α2) . (10b)





(α1 − α2) < 0, then the duality between the Rybczynski and Stolper—Samuelson
effects fails to hold.
2.2 Households
There is a continuum of identical households with a unit mass. Each household supply one







−ρtdt, σ > 0, ρ > 0,
where C is consumption and ρ denotes a given time discount rate. When σ = 1, then the
instantaneous felicity function is logC.
(i) Financial Autarky
If the households cannot access to the international financial market, then the aggregate
asset of the home country equals the aggregate capital stock held by the domestic households.










(w + π1 + π2 − C) , (11)
where δ ∈ [0, 1) is the rate of capital depreciation and πi denotes the excess profits in the
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i-th sector8. The households maximize U subject to (11) and the initial holding of cap-
ital, K0. When solving the optimization problem, the households take the sequences of
{rt, wt, π1,t,π2,t, pt}∞t=0 as given. Letting q be the implicit price of capital, the necessary
conditions for an optimum include the following:
C−σ = q/p, (12a)
q˙ = q (ρ+ δ − r/p) , (12b)
together with the transversality condition; limt→∞ e−ρtqK = 0.
(ii) International Lending and Borrowing
If the households in the home country can lend to or borrow from the foreign households,
then their flow budget constraint is given by
Ω˙ = RΩ+w + π1 + π2 − C, (13)
where Ω denotes the net wealth (evaluated in terms of consumption good):
Ω = B + pK.
where B is the stock of bonds (IOUs). We assume that bond and capital are perfect substi-
tutes and, hence, the non-arbitrage condition between the two assets requires that the rate




− δ + p˙
p
. (14)
Using (14) and Ω˙ = B˙ + pK˙ + p˙K, the flow budget constraint (13) is rewritten as
B˙ = RB + rK + w + π1 + π2 − C − pI, (15)
8Remember that the private technology of each production sector exhibits decreasing returns to scale with
respect to capital and labor.
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where I denote gross investment, so that
K˙ = I − δK. (16)












Set up the Hamiltonian function for the optimization problem:
H =
C1−σ − 1
1− σ + λ [RB + rK + w + π1 + π2 − C − pI] + q (I − δK) ,
where λ and q respectively denote the implicit prices of bonds and domestic capital. Focusing
on an interior solution, we see that the necessary conditions for an optimum are:
C−σ = λ (17a)
pλ = q, (17b)
λ˙ = λ (ρ−R) , (17c)
q˙ = q (ρ+ δ)− λr = q
µ




The optimization conditions also involve the transversality conditions on holding bond and
capital: limt→∞ λe−ρtB = 0 and limt→∞ qe−ρtK = 0.
3 The Model with Financial Autarky
We first assume that there is only intratemporal trade: both investment and consumption
goods are freely traded but households in each country neither lend to nor borrow from
the foreign households. This is the Heckscher-Ohlin setting employed by Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002).9 This section summarizes the main results of their contribution in order
9 If international lending and borrowing are possible in the Heckscher-Ohlin setting, the instantaneous
equilibrium itself becomes indeterminate. This is a reconfirmation of Mundell’s (1957) results shown in the
static Heckscher-Ohlin model. See also Cremers (1997) on this point. Note that we may introduce international
lending and borrowing into the Heckscher-Ohlin model, if the model economy involves financial frictions or
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to clarify the effects of introducing nontraded goods and financial transactions into the base
model.
Under free trade of both goods, the world market equilibrium conditions for investment
and consumption goods are repetitively given by
Y1 + Y
∗
1 = K˙ + K˙
∗ + δK + δK∗, (18)
Y2 + Y
∗
2 = C + C
∗, (19)
where an asterisk indicates the corresponding foreign variable. When both countries produce
both goods, all the firms in the world economy face the common world price, p. 10 Hence,
given the assumption of symmetric technologies between the two countries, both home and
foreign firms in each production sector select the same capital intensity, and thus it holds
that ki (p) = k∗i (p) (i = 1, 2) for all t ≥ 0. As a result, from (9a) and (18) the aggregate
capital in the world market changes according to
K˙w =
Kw − 2k2 (p)
k1 (p)− k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 − δKw, (20)
where KW = K + K∗. In addition, since the factor prices are equalized between the two
countries, (12b) gives
q˙/q = q˙∗/q∗ = ρ+ δ − r (p) /p. (21)
This means that q∗/q stays constant over time, so that from (12a) C∗/C is also constant
even out of the steady state. Thus the aggregate consumption demand in the world market
is written as C + C∗ = (1 + n¯)C, where n¯ is a positive constant.
As is well known, the conditions mentioned above enable us to treat the world economy
as if it were a closed economy with two types of households holding different levels of capital
investment adjustment costs: see Antras and Caballero (2009) and Ono and Shibata (2010).
10Our discussion depends on this assumption. If at least one country completely specializes, dynamic systems
of the world economy examined in Sections 3 and 4 are different from those displayed in this paper. However,
as shown by Appendix 1 of the paper, provided that both countries have identical taste and technology, the
steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is inside the diversification cone where both countries produce
both goods. Therefore, our assumption is justified as long as we focus on the local dynamics of the world
economy around the steady state equilibrium. To analyze the global behavior of the model, we need to treat
the model out of the diversification cone. Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) explore the dynamic behavior of a small
country that specializes in producing one of the two goods. Caliendo (2011) presents a detailed analysis of
dynamic behavior of a 2× 2× 2 model outside the diversification cone.
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stocks. Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) first show that the steady-state levels of Kw and p
are uniquely determined, while the steady-state conditions of the world economy do not pin
down the steady-state levels of K and K∗. Then they present the following:
Proposition 1 (Nishimura and Shimomura 2002) The steady-state equilibrium of the world
economy is locally indeterminate, if a1b1 −
a2
b2
< 0 and α1−α2 > 0 and (ii) 1/σ > max {1, 1/σ¯},
where σ¯ is a function of parameters involved in the model.
The first condition in Proposition 1 means that the investment good sector employes less
capital intensive technology than the consumption good sector from the private persecutive,
while it uses more capital intensive technology from the social perspective. The second
condition requires that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is high
enough.11 Since the aggregate dynamics of the world economy is identical to dynamics of
the closed economy, the indeterminacy conditions given above are the same as those found
by Benhabib and Nishimura (1998).
If the steady state of the world economy satisfies determinacy, the initial values of q
and q∗ (so the value of n¯) are uniquely specified under a given set of initial levels of K
and K∗. This means that the steady-state levels of K and K∗ are uniquely given by the
initial distribution of capital stocks. In this case, if the home country initially holds a larger
amount of capital than the foreign country, then the home country can keep her comparative
advantage in producing the capital-intensive goods during the transition towards the steady-
state equilibrium.12 Such a dynamic version of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, however, fails
to hold when the world economy exhibits equilibrium indeterminacy. When indeterminacy
exists, there is a continuum of converging paths around the steady state so that the steady-
state distribution of capital depends on which path is actually selected. Consequently, not
only the initial holdings of factor endowments but also belief-driven fluctuations may affect
11The precise expression of 1/σ¯ in Proposition 1 is
1
σ¯ =
(1− α1)a2b1(ρ+ δ) + α1a1 [ρb2 + δb1a2 + (1− a1)b2δ]
(a2b1 − a1b2) (α1 − α2) [ρ+ δ(1− a1)]
12This conclusion depends on the functional forms of production and utility functions we use as well as
on the fact that we restrict our attention to the model behavior near the steady state. As for more general
analyses on income and wealth distribution among the countries in the Heckscher-Ohlin world, see Atkson and
Kehoe (2000) and Bajona and Kehoe (2010). Atkeson and Kehoe (2000) treat a small-country model, while
Bajona and Kehoe (2010) explore a two-country model.
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long-term trade patterns of the world economy.
4 The Model with Lending and Borrowing
The main part of this section examines the case where investment goods are not internation-
ally traded, while there are international lending and borrowing. We also briefly consider the
opposite case where consumption goods are nontradable.
4.1 Nontradable Investment Goods
We now assume that consumption goods are internationally traded, and international lend-
ing and borrowing are allowed, but investment goods are non-tradables.13 Although such
an assumption is restrictive one, it elucidates the role of trade structure in a dynamic world
economy. In Section 5.2 we discuss the empirical plausibility of alternative trade structures
used in this paper. Since investment goods are traded in the domestic market alone and con-
sumption goods are internationally traded, the market equilibrium conditions for investment
and consumption goods are respectively given by
Y1 = K˙ + δK, Y ∗1 = K˙∗ + δK∗, (22)
Y2 + Y
∗
2 = C + C
∗, (23)
The equilibrium condition for the bond market is
B +B∗ = 0, (24)
which means that Ω + Ω∗ = pK + p∗K∗. Bonds are IOUs between the home and foreign
households and, hence, the aggregate value of bonds is zero in the world financial market at
large.
13 In the small-country setting, the trade structure assumed here is a kind of dependent economy models
discussed in open-economy macroeconomics literature. Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) and Weder (2001)
employ such a formulation. In the forgoing studies on models without externalities, Turnovsky and Sen (1995)
treat a small-open economy model with non-tradable capital and Turnovsky (1997, Chapter 7) studies a
neoclassical two-country, two-sector model in which capital goods are not traded. Mino (2008) also discusses




Investment goods are traded in the domestic market alone, so that the price of investment
goods in each country may differ from each other. Using (22), we find that capital stock in
each country changes according to
K˙ =
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p)− k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 − δK. (25a)
K˙∗ =
K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗)− k2 (p∗)
A2k1 (p
∗)α1 − δK∗. (25b)
Dynamics of the shadow values of capital are:
q˙ = q[ρ+ δ − er (p)], (26a)
q˙∗ = q∗ [ρ+ δ − er (p∗)] , (26b)
Here, p does not necessarily equal p∗ during the transition. Therefore, unlike the model in
the previous section, the relative shadow value of capital, q/q∗, does not stay constant out
of the steady state. Dynamic equations (25a) , (25b) , (26a) and (26b) depict behaviors of
capital stocks and their implicit prices in the home and foreign countries.
To obtain a complete dynamic system, we should find the relations between p and p∗
and the state variables, K, K∗, q and q∗. The foreign country’s optimization conditions
corresponding to (17a) and (17c) are respectively given by C∗−σ = λ∗ and λ˙∗/λ∗ = ρ − R.
Therefore, both λ∗/λ and C∗/C stay constant over time. Let us denote C∗/C = (λ∗/λ)−1/σ =
m¯ (> 0) . Then the world market equilibrium condition for consumption (23) is expressed as
(1 + m¯)λ− 1σ = y2 (K, p) + y2 (K∗, p∗) , (27)
where y2 (K, p) is defined by (9b) and y2 (K∗, p∗) is given by
y2 (K∗, p∗) =
k1 (p
∗)−K∗




In view of (27) , we see that λ is expressed as a function of capital stocks, prices and m¯ :
λ = (1 + m¯)σ [y2 (K, p) + y2 (K∗, p∗)]−σ
≡ λ (K,K∗, p, p∗; m¯) . (28)
Thus optimization conditions (17b) and q∗ = λ∗p∗ give
p =
q
λ (K,K∗, p, p∗; m¯) , p
∗ =
q∗
m¯−σλ (K,K∗, p, p∗; m¯) .
Solving these equations with respect to p and p∗ presents the following expressions:
p = π (K,K∗, q, q∗; m¯) , p∗ = π∗ (K,K∗, q, q∗; m¯) . (29)
Substituting (29) into (25a) , (25b) , (26a) and (26b) , we obtain a dynamic system of K, K∗, q
and q∗ under a given level of m¯. In Appendix 2 of the paper, we analyze this dynamic system
to derive indeterminacy conditions.
Alternatively, we can obtain a dynamic system ofK, K∗, p and p∗ in the following manner.


























where Y 2 ≡ y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗, p∗) denotes the aggregate supply of consumption goods in the














λ∗ = R+ δ − er (p∗) . (31b)
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(R+ δ − er (p)) + Y 2p∗p∗
Y 2
(R+ δ − er (p∗))# .
Observe that each side of the above equation does not involve m¯. Solving the above with
respect to R, we find that the equilibrium level of the world interest rate can be expressed as
a function of K,K∗, p and p∗ :
R = R (K,K∗, p, p∗) . (32)
Consequently, by use of (25a) , (25b) , (31a) , (31b) and (32) , we obtain the dynamic
system with respect to (K,K∗, p, p∗) in such a way that
K˙ = y1 (K, p)− δK,
K˙∗ = y1 (K∗, p∗)− δK∗,
p˙ = p [R (K,K∗, p, p∗) + δ − er (p)] ,





In the above, function R (.) is rather complex, so that stability analysis of (33) is more
cumbersome than analyzing the system of (K,K∗, q, q∗) . However, since the solutions of (33)
do not depend on m¯, as shown in the next section, this alternative expression of dynamic
system is useful for considering how m¯ is determined.
4.3 Steady-State of the World Economy
We first characterize the stationary equilibrium of the world economy. In the steady state,
all of K, K∗, p, p∗, B, B∗, q, q∗ and λ stay constant over time. Inspecting the steady state
conditions, we obtain the following:
Proposition 2 Suppose that investment goods are not traded and international lending and
borrowing are allowed. Then there is a feasible steady-state equilibrium where the steady-state
levels of capital and relative price in each country satisfy K = K∗ and p = p∗ and they are
uniquely given.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.
It is to be noted that while the steady-state levels of K (= K∗) and p (= p∗) are uniquely
determined by the parameters involved in the model, the steady-state values of implicit prices
of capital, q and q∗, cannot be determined by the parameter values alone. To see this, notice
that from the optimization condition (17b) , in the steady state it holds that
p = λq, p = m¯σλq∗, (34)
From (28) in the steady state the implicit price of bond held in the home country, λ, is given
by
λ = (1 + m¯)σ [2y2 (K, p)]−σ.
Since λ depends on m¯, we should know the value of m¯ to determine the steady-state levels
of λ, q and q∗. To find the value of m¯, consider the current account of each country. Noting
that the market equilibrium condition for the investment goods in (22) and the factor income
distribution relation give pY1+Y2 = rK+w+π1+π2 and p∗Y ∗1 +Y ∗2 = r∗K∗+w∗+π∗1+π∗2,
we see that the dynamic equation of bond holdings are expressed as
B˙ = RB + Y2 − C, B˙∗ = RB∗ + Y ∗2 − C∗.
These equations represent the current accounts of both countries. In view of the no-Ponzi
game and the transversality conditions, the intertemporal constraint for the current account

































































y2 (Kt, pt) dt+B0
. (35)
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Equation (35) demonstrates that m¯ depends on the initial holdings of bonds, B0 and B∗0 ,
as well as on the entire sequences of {Kt,K∗t , pt, p∗t }∞t=0 . Remember that the equilibrium paths
of (Kt,K∗t , pt, p
∗) determined by (33) and do not depend on m¯. As a consequence, although
the steady-state level of p depends only on the parameter values involved in the model, the
steady state levels of q (= λp) and q∗ (= m¯−σλp∗) cannot be determined without specifying
the initial holdings of bonds and the paths of the state variables. Therefore, if the dynamic
system (33) exhibits indeterminacy, the value of m¯ (so the steady-state values of q and q∗)
are indeterminate as well.
4.4 Indeterminacy Conditions
We now examine the local dynamics of the world economy around the steady state. A set of
sufficient conditions for equilibrium indeterminacy for the model with nontraded investment
goods is as follows:
Proposition 3 Suppose that investment goods are not traded and international lending and
borrowing are allowed. If the investment good sector is more capital intensive than the con-
sumption good sector from the social perspective but it is less capital intensive from the private
perspective, that is, a2b2 −
a1
b1
> 0 and α2 −α1 < 0, then the steady state of the world economy
where investment goods are nontradable exhibits local indeterminacy.
Proof. See Appendix 2 .
Proposition 3 claims that in our model equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge regardless
of the magnitude of σ. This is in contrast to Proposition 1 for the indeterminacy conditions
for the case of free trade of both consumption and investment goods without international
lending and borrowing. When both investment and consumption goods are freely traded, in
addition to the factor-intensity ranking conditions, the intertemporal elasticity in consump-
tion (1/σ) should be sufficiently high to hold indeterminacy. Since the closed economy version
of our model is the same as the integrated world economy model discussed by Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002), we need the same condition for holding indeterminacy if our model econ-
omy is closed. Hence, our result shows that the financially integrated world with non-tradable
capital goods may produce indeterminacy under a wider range of parameter spaces than in
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the closed economy counterpart. In this sense, our model indicates that opening up interna-
tional trade may enhance the possibility of belief-driven economic fluctuations, if investment
goods are nontradables. In Section 5.1 we present an intuitive implication of the difference
in the indeterminacy conditions in Propositions 1 and 3.
4.5 Long-Run Wealth Distribution
In the steady state it holds that B˙ = B˙∗ = 0 and R = ρ. Considering that C+C∗ = 2y2 (K, p)
and C∗ = m¯C, we find that the steady-state level of bond holdings in the home and foreign
countries are respectively given by
B =




2 (K,p) , (36a)
B∗ =




2 (K, p) . (36b)
The above expressions show that once m¯ is selected, the long-run asset position of each
country is also determined. The asset holdings in the steady state are:
Ω = B + pK, Ω∗ = B∗ + pK.
Thus the long-run wealth distribution between the two countries depends on the long-run
levels of B and B∗. It is obvious that whether the home country becomes a debtor or a
creditor in the long run depends solely on whether or not m¯ exceeds one. Consequently,
determinant of m¯ plays a pivotal role for the long-run distribution of wealth.
Now consider (3335) . If the steady state of (33) is locally determinate (i.e. the linearized
dynamic system has two stable roots), then the equilibrium path of pt and p∗t are uniquely
expressed as functions of Kt and K∗t on the two-dimensional stable manifold. When we
denote the relation between the relative prices and capital stocks on the stable saddle path
as p = φ (K,K∗) and p∗ = φ∗ (K,K∗) , the behaviors of capital stocks on the stable manifold
are expressed as
K˙ = y1 (K,φ (K,K∗))− δK,
K˙∗ = y1 (K∗,φ∗ (K,K∗))− δK∗.
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These differential equations show that once the initial capital stocks,K0 andK∗0 , are specified,
the paths of {Kt,K∗t }∞t=0 are uniquely determined. As a result, the paths of {pt, p∗t , Rt}∞t=0
are also uniquely given under the specified levels of K0 and K∗0 . This means that when
equilibrium determinacy holds, the left hand side of (35) that depends on the entire sequences
of {pt, p∗t ,Kt,K∗}∞t=0 is also determinate, so that m¯ has a unique value under the given initial
levels of K0, K∗0 , B0 and B
∗
0 . In this case, the long-term distribution of wealth between
the two countries is uniquely determined. For example, if the initial stocks of capital and
bonds held by the home households are relatively large, then the home country tends to be
a creditor in the long-run equilibrium.
By contrast, if the converging path of (33) is indeterminate (that is, the linearly approx-
imated dynamic system of (33) has three or four stable roots), then the given initial levels
of K0 and K∗0 alone cannot pin down the equilibrium paths of pt and p
∗
t . Therefore, the
level of m¯ given by (35) becomes indeterminate as well. In this situation, an extrinsic shock
that affects expectations of agents in the world market may alter the equilibrium path and,
therefore, it changes the level of m¯.
To sum up, we have shown:
Proposition 4 If the steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is locally determinate
(indeterminate), then the steady-state level of asset position of each country is determinate
(indeterminate).
4.6 Non-Tradable Consumption Goods
Now consider the opposite situation where the consumption goods are not internationally
traded, but the investment goods are tradable and financial capital mobility is possible. In
this case the commodity market equilibrium conditions are given by
I + I∗ = Y1 + Y
∗
1 , C = Y2, C
∗ = Y ∗2 . (37)
We take the tradable investment good as a numeraire. Then the net wealth (in terms of
investment good) held by the households in the home country is Ω = B + K and the flow
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budget constraint is written as
B˙ = R (B +K) + w + π1 + π2 − epC − I,
where ep (= 1/p) denotes the domestic price of consumption good in terms of tradable in-




1− σ + λ [RB + rK + w + π1 + π2 − epC − I] + q (I − δK)
and the key first-order conditions for an optimum are:
C−σ = λep, (38a)
λ = q (38b)
λ˙ = λ (ρ−R) , (38c)
q˙ = q (ρ+ δ − r) . (38d)
Conditions (38b) , (38c) and (38d) lead to R = r − δ.
Since households in both country face the common interest rate, R in the international
bond market, the rate of return to capital in both countries satisfy
r∗ = R+ δ = r. (39)
Thus r (1/ep) = r (1/ep∗) holds in each moment, implying that ep always equals ep∗. Conse-
quently, it holds that ki (1/ep) = ki(1/ep∗) (i = 1, 2, ) , so that the world-market equilibrium
condition of investment good yields the dynamic equation of the aggregate capital exactly
the same as (20) . In addition, from the equilibrium condition for consumption goods in each
country in (37) we obtain
C = y2 (K, ep) , C∗ = y2 (K∗, ep) .
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In this case it holds that λ∗/λ = q∗/q∗ stay constant over time. Therefore, we obtain C∗ = s¯C,
where s¯ = (λ∗/λ)−1/σ . This leads to
(1 + s¯)C = y2 (K, ep) + y2 (K∗, ep) .
Consequently, the dynamic system of the world economy is the same as that of the Nishimura-
Shimomura model.
Proposition 5 If consumption goods are not traded and international lending and borrowing
are possible, the indeterminacy conditions are the same as those for the case where both goods
are traded without financial capital mobility.
Therefore, in this case opening up international trade does not enhance the possibility of
belief-driven business cycles. An intuitive implication of this result is as follows. If investment
goods are tradable, a unit of bond is equivalent to a claim to the future capital good. Since
bonds and capital are perfect substitutes, bonds yield the same rate of return as that of
capital. Thus the interest rate of bond equals the net rate of return to capital. The interest
rate in the integrated financial market is common for both countries, which means that the
rate of return to capital in both country is the same as well. Since both countries have identical
technologies, the relative price in each country is also the same, so that the integrated world
economy behaves exactly the same manner as that of the economy in the Heckscher-Ohlin
environment.
When only consumption goods are internationally traded, one unit of bond is a claim to
the future consumption good. Hence, the non-arbitrage condition between holding of bond
and capital shows that the rate of return to capital diverges from the world interest rate when
the relative price between consumption and investment changes. Hence, the factor prices (so
that the relative price) in each country are not identical during the transition. The failure of




5.1 Implication of the Indeterminacy Conditions
Intuition behind the difference in indeterminacy condition between Propositions 1 and 3 is
as follows:
(i) Free Trade of Commodities
First consider the case where both consumption and investment goods are traded in the
absence of international lending and borrowing. Suppose that a positive sunspot shock hits
the world economy and all the households in the world expect that the rate of return to their
capital will rise in the future. Such an impact makes the households reduce their current
consumption and invest more. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
1/σ, is sufficiently high, there is a large increase in the future consumption. Meanwhile,
the households expand their current investment and the world-wide capital stock will rise.
Since we have assumed that the private technology of consumption good sectors is more
capital intensive than that of the investment good sector, a higher capital stock will expand
the consumption production in both countries through the Rybczynski effect. However, the
strong intertemporal substitution effect yields a large increase in future consumption demand
and, hence, the relative price p must increase to equilibrate the world-wide consumption good
market. (Remember that from (10b) under our assumptions of a1b1 −
q2
b2
< 0 and α1−α2 > 0,
a higher p increases Y2 and Y ∗2 .) Noting that a rise in p increases er (p) under α1 − α2 > 0, a
higher p actually raises the rate of return to capital, so that the initial expectations can be
self-fulfilled.
By contrast, if 1/σ is not high enough, the above mechanism of adjustment will not
work. If 1/σ is small, the intertemporal substitution effect is small and thus the expected
rise in the future rate of return produce a relatively small amount of increase in the future
consumption. If this is the case, an increase in consumption good production generated by a
rise in K through the Rybczynski effect may exceed the increase in consumption demand. As
a result, the relative price will decline to curtail the production level of consumption goods
to meet the relatively small increase in demand. Hence, in contrast to the case with a high
1/σ, a lower p reduces er (p) .This means that the initial expectations are not self fulfilled, and
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thus the equilibrium path of the world economy is determinate.
(ii) Nontradable Investment Goods
Next, consider the case where only consumption goods are traded and international lend-
ing and borrowing are allowed. In this case, the relative price in each country is not the
same during the transition. Suppose that households in the home country expect that the
rate of return to their capital will rise. As before, the households intend to raise their saving
to invest more. In the Heckscher-Ohlin environment, this requires that households reduce
their current consumption, and thus the magnitude of σ plays an important role. However,
in the presence of international financial market, the households in the home country may
increase their investment by borrowing from foreign households rather than by lowering their
current consumption. Hence, investment demand will increase even if σ is not small. Then
the households in the home country pay their debt by exporting consumption goods to the
foreign country. Hence, the consumption good production in the home country will expand.
This means that the relative price p may increase to complement the positive effect of a
higher K on consumption good production. If this is the case, the rate of return to capital
in the home country actually rise to fulfill the initial expectations of the households.
5.2 Empirical Plausibility of the Basic Assumptions
(i) Distinction between Traded and Nontraded Goods
In this paper we have considered three types of trade structures: (i) both investment and
consumption goods are internationally traded; (ii) only consumption goods are traded, and;
(iii) only investment goods are traded. In reality, considerable portions of both consumption
and investment goods are traded in the domestic markets alone. For example, Coeurdacier
(2009) claims that more than 50% of US consumption goods are not traded in the international
markets, because the value added of services most of which are nontradables shares 55% of
the aggregate value of consumption goods. Similarly, Baxter et al. (1998), Jin (2011), and
Stockman and Tesar (1995) point out that more than 50% of consumption goods are not
internationally traded in the US.
As for investment goods, Bems (2008) finds that the share of investment expenditure on
nontraded goods is about 60% and that this figure has been considerably stable over the last
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50 years both in developed and developing countries. Since construction and structures share
a large part of investment goods, Bems’ finding seems to be a plausible one.
Judging from those empirical facts, the traditional assumption of free trade of all com-
modities (trade structure (i)) is far from the reality. At the same time, it is rather hard to
determine which of trade structures (ii) or (iii) is more realistic. Probably, it is safe to con-
clude that both (ii) and (iii) have roughly the same distance from the reality. However, from
the theoretical viewpoint, the key condition for the relation between openness of an economy
and belief-driven fluctuations is whether or not investment goods are freely traded. As we
have seen in Section 4.6, if investment goods are tradables, the indeterminacy conditions do
not diverge from those for the case of free intratemporal trade of both commodities.14
(ii) Externalities and Factor Intensity Ranking
The indeterminacy conditions in Proposition 1 and 3 require that constant returns pre-
vail in each production sector at the social level and that there is a factor-intensity reversal
between the private and social technologies. The production technologies assumed in this
paper demonstrate that equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge even in the absence of strong
increasing returns associated with large degree of external effects.15 Several investigations on
scale economies and factor-intensity ranking have suggested that our indeterminacy condi-
tions are empirically plausible ones. For example, the well-cited study by Basu and Fernald
(1997) finds that most industries in the US approximately exhibit constant returns to scale.
Using the US data, Based on a detailed investigation of disaggregated data of the US indus-
tries, Harrison (2003) claims that consumption good industries exhibits decreasing internal
returns to scale. Their aggregate returns including external effects are close to constant.
Investment goods industries, on the other hand, show weak returns to scale. Those findings
suggest that our assumption of social constant returns in both consumption and investment
good sectors is not far from the reality.
14 It is worth pointing out that Meng and Velasco (2004) show that indeterminacy still holds even if there
are both traded and nontraded investment goods. Reconsidering their finding in the context of our world
economy model would be a useful extension.
15 In our notation, external effects associated with capital and labor in i-th sector are respectively given by














Notice that the above inequalities can hold, even though the magnitudes of external effects, εi and ηi, are
sufficiently small.
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As to the factor-intensity ranking between the two sectors, a recent study by Takahashi
et al. (2012) find that in most of the OECD countries, the consumption good sector uses a
more capital intensive technology than the investment good sector.16 They also show that
the gap in capital intensities between the two production sectors is generally small. If there
is a large difference in factor intensities from the private perspective, then we need large
degree of production externalities to establish the factor-intensity reversal between the social
and private technologies. The relatively small difference in the capital-labor ratios between
the consumption and investment good sectors means that the factor-intensity reversal may
hold even in the presence of small-scale external effects. Although the empirical studies
cited above do not directly support our assumptions, they indicate that the indeterminacy
conditions given in Proposition 3 can hold under a set of empirically plausible magnitudes of
parameter values involved in our model.
6 Final Remarks
The world economy as a whole is a closed economy in which there are multiple countries.
Therefore, its model structure is similar to that of a closed, single economy model with
heterogeneous agents. In particular, if consumption and saving decisions are made by the
representative household in each country, the world economy model is closely connected to
the closed economy model with heterogeneous households. There is, however, an important
difference between the world economy models and the single country setting: when dealing
with the world economy model, we should specify the trade structure between the countries.
This paper has revealed that the specification of trade structure plays an important role as
to the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy, even if there is no international heterogeneity
in technologies and preferences.
Our research topic can be explored further in several directions. First, we may recon-
sider indeterminacy of equilibrium without assuming symmetric technologies and preferences
between the two countries. Recently, several authors have explored how the presence of het-
erogeneous preferences and technologies alter the determinacy/indeterminacy conditions in
16 In their estimation, Takahashi et al. (2012) do not assume the presence of production externalities. This
means that their finding would support our assumption in Proposition 3, that is, the consumption good sector
employes more capital intensive technology than the investment good sector from the private perspective.
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the equilibrium business cycle models with market distortions. These studies have shown
that the heterogeneity in preferences and technologies often affects stability condition in a
critical manner.17 In a similar vein, Sim and Ho (2007) find that introducing technological
heterogeneity into the Nishimura-Shimomura model may produce a substantial change in
equilibrium indeterminacy results. In addition, even if taste and technologies are identical
in both countries, introducing financial frictions, policy distortions and adjustment costs of
investment also breaks the symmetry between the home and foreign countries at least during
the transition process. Further investigation of our problem in a more general modelling
would be promising.18
Second, it would be useful to examine our topic in a general model in which both con-
sumption and investment goods are partially traded. In such a framework, we may investigate
how changes in the shares of tradables affect indeterminacy conditions. This research would
provide us with useful results as to the relation between the degree of ’globalization’ and
belief-driven, international business cycles.
Finally, our discussion may apply to the regional economy setting as well. Judging from
our findings, we may conjecture that specific patterns of commodity trade and factor mobility
between multiple regions would produce equilibrium indeterminacy of the entire economy. It
is also an interesting topic for our future research to study the relation between intranational
trade patterns and sunspot-driven business fluctuations. 19
Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 2
When q˙ = q˙∗ = 0 in (26a) and (26b) , it holds that
a1A1k1 (p)
α1−1 = a1A1k1 (p
∗)α1−1 = ρ+ δ.
17See, for example, Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2005).
18Antras and Caballero (2009) introduce financial frictions into the two-county Heckscher-Ohlin model. Ono
and Shibata (2010) and Jin (2011) introduce adjustment costs of investment into 2×2× 2 models.
19We thank one of the referees for this suggestion.
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Thus by use of (3a) we find:














These conditions show that the steady-state levels of p and p∗ are uniquely given and it
holds that p = p∗ in the steady state. The steady-state levels of capital stocks satisfying
K˙ = K˙∗ = 0 in (25a) and (25b) are determined by the following conditions:
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p)− k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 = δK,
K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗)− k2 (p∗)
A1k1 (p
∗)α1 = δK∗.
Using the conditions for p˙ = p˙∗ = 0 and the fact that p = p∗ holds in the steady state, we
confirm that the steady-state level of capital stock in each county has the same value, which
is given by













which has a positive value. We also find that the steady-state values of labor allocation to













´ ∈ (0, 1) .
Hence, (8) is fulfilled so that both countries imperfectly specialize.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 3
Since the functional form of R (K,K∗, p, p∗) in (33) is complicated, it is simpler to treat a
dynamic system with respect to K, K∗, q and q∗ displayed in Section 4.1. We thus focus on
the dynamics system consisting of (25a) , (25b ) , (26a) and (26b) with p = π (K,K∗, q, , q∗; m¯)
and p∗ = π∗ (K,K∗, q, q∗; m¯) , where m¯ is fixed.20
20When the dynamic system of (K,K∗, q, q∗) satisfies equilibrium determinacy under a given level of m¯,
then the equilibrium paths of K and K∗ are uniquely determined under given levels of K0 and K∗0 . Therefore,
equilibrium path of (33) is also uniquely determined. Conversely, if the dynamic system of (K,K∗, q, q∗)
exhibits local indeterminacy, the equilibrium paths of K and K∗ cannot be uniquely determined by selecting
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To prove Proposition 3, the following facts are useful:
Lemma 1 In the symmetric steady state where K = K∗ and q = q∗, the following relations
are satisfied:
yiK (K, p) = y
i
K∗ (K
∗, p∗) , i = 1, 2,
yip (K, p) = y
i
p∗ (K
∗, p∗) , i = 1, 2,
πK (K,K∗, q, q∗) = π∗K (K,K∗, q, q∗) = πK∗ (K,K∗, q, q∗) = π∗K∗ (K,K∗, q, q∗) ,
πq (K,K∗, q, q∗) = π∗q∗ (K,K∗, q, q∗) ,
πq∗ (K,K∗, q, q∗) = π∗q (K,K∗, q, q∗) .
Proof. By the functional forms of yij (·) (i = 1, 2, j = K,K∗, p, p∗), it is easy to see that
yiK (K, p) = y
i
K∗ (K
∗, p∗) and yip (K,p) = y
i
p∗ (K
∗, p∗) are established when p = p∗ and K =
K∗. As for the rest of the results, we use pλ (·) = q and p∗λ (·) m¯−σ = q∗. total differentiation
of pλ (·) = q and p∗λ (·) m¯−σ = q∗ yields the following:
∂p
∂K = πK = −
pλK




∗ = − pλK
∗














λ+ pλP + p∗λp∗
, (A2)
∂p
∂q = πq =
λ+ p∗λp∗


















λ+ pλP + p∗λp∗
. (A4)
Since λK(·) = λK∗ (·) and λp (·) = λp∗ (·) in the steady state where K = K∗ and p = p∗,, we
obtain πK = π∗K = πK∗ = π∗, πq = π∗q∗ and πq∗ = π∗q .
Under a given level of m¯, let us linearize the dynamic system of (25a) , (25b ) , (26a) and
K0 and K∗0 . This means that (33) also holds equilibrium indeterminacy.
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y1K − δ + y1pπK y1pπK∗ y1pπq y1pπq∗
y1p∗π∗K y1K∗ − δ + y1p∗π∗K∗ y1p∗π∗q y1p∗π∗q∗
−qer0πK −qer0πK∗ −qer0πq −qer0πq∗




By use of Lemma 1, we see that the characteristic equation of J is written as




η − (y1K − δ + y1pπK) −y1pπK −y1pπq −y1pπq∗
−y1pπK η − (y1K − δ + y1pπK) −y1pπq∗ −y1pπq
qer00πK qer0πK η + qer0πq qer0πq∗











0 η − (y1K − δ) 0 η
qer0πK qer0πK η + qer0πq qer0πq∗









η + qrˆ0(πq − πq∗)
¤
ξ (η) .
where η denotes the characteristic root of J and
ξ (η) ≡ η2 +
£
qer0 (πq + πq∗)− ¡y1K − δ¢− 2y1pπK¤ η − qer0 ¡y1K − δ¢ (πq + πq∗) .
Our assumptions mean that a1b1 −
a2
b2
< 0 and α1 − α2 > 0. Thus from (10a) we see that
y1K − δ < 0. In addition, the equations in (A3) mean that πq−πq∗ = 1/λ (> 0) . Hence, using
rˆ (p) ≡ a1A1k1 (p)α1−1 , we obtain:
er0 (πq − πq∗) = a1 (a1 − 1)A1 (k1 (p))a1−2 k01 (p)λ > 0.
30
Thus at least two roots of Γ (η) = 0 have negative real parts. In addition, (A3) shows



















y2 (K, p) + y2 (K∗, p∗)
¤− 1σ−1 < 0.










Notice that under our assumptions, it holds that y2p (K, p) > 0. Suppose that σ is small
enough to satisfy σ < py2p/y2. Then λp + 2pλp > 0 so that πq + πq∗ < 0, which leads to
−qer0 ¡y1K − δ¢ (πq + πq∗) < 0.
This means that ξ (η) = 0 has one positive and one negative roots. As a result, Γ (η) = 0
has three stable roots. Hence, if σ is smaller than the price elasticity of supply function of
consumption goods, then there locally exists a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to
the steady state.


















because y1p < 0 and y
2






(πq + πq∗) > 0,
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qer0 (πq + πq∗)− ¡y1K − δ¢− 2y1KπK > 0.
These conditions mean that ξ (η) = 0 has two roots with negative real parts and, hence, all
the roots of Γ (η) = 0 are stable ones. In sum, if a1b1 − a2b2 < 0 and α1 − α2 > 0, then the
characteristic equation of the linearized system involves at least three stable roots, regardless
of the value of σ.
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